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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF T1IE 
State of Utah 
SLL\[ OLSON, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
KEITH "\VINEGAR, doing business 
as INTER!IOUNTAIN OIL 
DISTRIBUTORS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT•s BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 7801 
The records will show that on June 6, 1951, plaintiff 
and respondent filed suit to recover the sum of $3778.43 
principal with legal interest, attorney's fees in the sum 
of $250.00 and costs. On July 31. 195L defendant and 
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appellant filed a purported Jnotion to dismiss, which 
nwtion in fact had no legal meaning or significance, in 
as 1nuch as it was not signed by a person duly authorized 
to practice law in the state of Utah. It is obvious that 
this motion is a nullity, and is of no consequence. Hule 
11, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure. 
''Every pleading of a party represented by an 
attorney shall be signed in his individual name by 
at least one attorney who js duly licensed to practice 
in the state of Utah * * * '*'" 
On the 14th day of August, the trial court properly 
denied the purported motion to dismiss, and it should be 
noted that defendant failed to appear in court to press his 
1notion. At this tin1e, the court ordered this instant case 
consolidated with the case of ICeith Winegar, d.b.a. Iuter-
nwuntain Oil Distributors v. Slim Olson, Inc. 1 a corpora-
tion, Case No. 4293. T. p 31. 
On the 28th day of August., 1951, defendant filed his 
answer in which he admitted that the sum due and owing 
plaintiff is $3761.31, with legal interest from the lOth day 
of July, 1951, and allegedly tendered this sum to the court, 
which in actuality was never tendered in fact - again 
showing the defendant realized that his purported motion 
was not well taken. 
On October 3, 1951, and immediately after the con-
clusion of the trial of the former case, to-wit: Keith "\Vine-
gar v. Slim Olson, Inc., No. 4293, and in accordance with 
the order of consolidation ( transCI·ipt P. 31) this case was 
regularly called for trial; plaintiff and defendant were 
both present in court and represented by the respective 
counsel at whiC'h time counsel for Keith \Vineg&r objected 
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to going forward on the grounds that he did not know of 
the order of consolidation and that, in any event, he de-
~ired the in~tant ease to be lward before a judge other 
than Judge Hendrieks. \Yhereupon the eourt ordered a 
pre-trial to be had. At that time, it was there stipulated 
that the only issue was the question of attorney's fees 
(transcript P. 32). Nothing was said concerning def~nd­
ant 's contention that this clain1 should have been pleaded 
as a counterclai1n. At the conclusion of the pre-trial the 
court ~et the instant C'ase for trial on OC'toher 9, 1951. 
On October 9, 1951, the tnal was had, and the only 
i~sue, under the pre-trial order was that of attorney's 
fees. There was no question about the fact that the sum 
was owed, but the question of attorney's fees was argued, 
and the court allowed defendant one week to brief the 
question of whether or not this wa~ a c01npulsory counter-
claim, and plaintiff an additional week to answer defend-
ant's brief. After the court had considered both parties 
briefs, he entered judg1nent for plaintiff as against de-
fendant, from which this appeal is taken. 
Prior to the filing of this action and on ~f arch 24, 
1951, defendant had filed an action against plaintiff for 
damages caused by an alleged negligent installation of a 
filter bag on his diesel engine. On April 9, 1951: plaintiff 
in this case filed his answer. It is in this suit--a tort 
action concerning a specific in::;ttance and ·sole transaction 
-that defendant claims plaintiff should have filed the 
instant action on an open aceount for goods sold and 
delivered, as a counterclairn. Let it be noted that over 
$3,000.00 of plaintiff's account arose after the alleged 
neglance of plaintiff's agent, and further, between 
$500.00 and $600.00 was incurred after plaintiff's answer 
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in the tort action had been filed. There is no evidence 
that any of the items except the one January 24th, 1951, 
had any connection with or involved the diesel truck 
which was the subject of the first case. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT No. I 
The trial court did not err in awarding counsel fees. 
POINT No. II 
The trial court did not err in allowing recovery with 
respect to items in the account which appellant alleges 
should have been asserted as a counterclaim in another 
action. 
ARGU~iENT 
POINT No. I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN A \V ARD-
ING COUNSEL FEES. 
Exhibit "A" will show that all of the sales slips in 
question contain the following statement on the lower 
part of the slip, to-wit: 
''Received frorn SLL\I OLSON, INC., the above 
described merchandise. The undersigned agrees to 
pay all costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, 
if this account is referred to an attorney for collec-
tion.'' 
Each of the slips bears the signature of either ap-
pellant or one of his agents. 
The law of principal and agency in this sort of case 
is so fundamental that it is obvious that there is no merit 
in appellants Point No. 1. It is clearly the law, that the 
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actual location of the ~ignatnr0 on a rontnwt does not 
affert its validity. 
In 1:2 An1. Juris. p 5r):2. Sel'. 61, it states thi~ funda-
Inental law as follows: 
··A party is bound by a written contract even 
thmt-gh his signature does not appear at its end. 
(Italics ours) If his nmne, written by himself, ap-
pears in any part of the agreement, it 1nay be taken 
as his signature, if it were written for the purpose 
of giving authenticity to the instrument, and thus 
operating as a signature. Therefore, words written 
on the back of a contract blank as a portion of the 
instrument to be signed by the parties become part 
of the obligation, although the signatures are not 
below them but are on the preceding page.'' 
The law thus stated is so elemental that nothing 
more need be said. 
The sales slips not signed by Keith Winegar, were 
signed by his drivers and agents, and it was their duty 
to service "\Vinegars cars and trucks. Being in the scope 
of their employment, it follows that their signatures on 
the sales slips bound the principal \Vinegar with the terms 
of the contract. 
In 2 Am. Juris. p 70, Sec. 86, the following general 
law is stated: 
'' * * * * An agent expressly authorized to do a 
particular act or acts, or conduct a particular tran-
saction has implied authority to do acts which are 
incidental to, usually accompany, or are reasonably 
necessary to the accomplishment of performance of 
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the principal act or transaction delegated." 
'rhe drivers had the authority to buy gas, supplies 
and services on cr~dit, and in order so to do, they had 
the authority under general agency principals to sign 
sales slips and bind their principal to the terms of the 
contract. In any event, this procedure had been carried 
on for a long period of time, and Winegar had never 
questioned the provision on the sales slip, and had never 
given notice that the drivers had no right to bind him on 
such provision. Under the law and under the facts, he is 
now estopped frorn asserting such a ground upon appeal. 
POINT No. II 
The trial court did not err in allowing recovery with 
respect to items in the account which appellant allege 
should have been asserted as a counterclaim in another 
action. 
It is our contention that, with the possible exception 
of the sales slip n1ade up at the time of the alleged neg-
ligence of plaintiff's agent, there can be absolutely no 
part of plaintiff's claim construed as arising out of the 
• 'transaction or occurrance'' out of which defendants 
cause of a:ction for damages arose. 
Defendant's claim arose out of an alleged negligent 
act of plaintiff's agent in a particular servicing of his 
diesel truck. It is a tort action. It is in no way con-
nected with previous or subsequent sales of supplies and 
services. Each sale was a separate act. There was no 
contract or agreement between the parties that defendant 
would buy his supplies and services at plaintiff's place 
of business, nor was there a contract or agreement that 
plaintiff would sell to defendant, or would service his 
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cars and trucks. Defendant n1erely emne in when he de-
~ired, serviced his vehicles, and signed credit slips for 
each transaction. Pnder this fact situation, it is baffling 
how defendant reaches the conclusion that the two cases 
arose out of the sanw transaction. The most that might 
he said on his matter is that plaintiff's claim mi,qht he a 
permissive counterrlaim, rPrtainly not a eompulsory one. 
After adJ.nission by the defendant throughout the 
case, that the account was due and owing, defendant 
now is trying to defeat a valid claim for goods, sup-
plies, and services sold and delivered through an ima-
ginary teclmicality. Even if appellants could, by some 
stretch of the imagination, place plaintiff's clailn into 
the category of a emnpulsory counterclaim, let it be noted 
that this case and defendant's previous case for damages 
were consolidated after defendant had apparently aban-
doned his plea that this is a proper case for a compulsory 
counterclaim. Further, let it be noted that it was the de-
fendant u.'ho refused to have this case heard at the con-
clusion of his own case. Had he gone forward, the result 
would have been the same as if the second case had been 
pleaded as a counterclaim. Appellant, by his own acts, 
defeated the manner of procedure which would have, in 
effect, 1nade this action one of counterclaim. 
Now coming to the rule involved, which reads in part 
as follows: 
"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any 
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the 
pleader has against any opposing party if it arises 
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the s1.tb_ject 
matter of the opposing party's claim, * * * * " Rule 
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13 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
rl,he transaction or occurrence referred to 1n the rule 
applied to the Winegar case was the alleged servicing of 
his tractor on January 24th, 1951. That is the only trans-
action alleged by Winegar in the complaint from which 
his action in damages stemmed. It may be that the serv-
ice charge of $11.06 on that day was the service alleged 
to have been negligently m~de in the first action, and 
Inight be considered as having arisen out of the transac-
tion or occurrence but certainly not more than that. The 
purpose of the rule should be considered. The philosophy 
of the rule is to discourage separate actions which make 
for n1ultiplicity of suits and wherever possible to permit 
and smnetimes require combining in one litigation all the 
<'ross claims of the parties, particularly where they arise 
out of the same transaction. Gallahar v. George H. 
Rheman Co., 7 F. R. Serv., 13 F. 12, 50 Fed. Supp., 655, 
(D.C.S.D.G.A. 1943.) 
''The decided cases indicate that the word'' tram;-
action'' denotes something done, a completed action 
an affair as a whole. In Croft Refrigeration Mark 
Co. v. Qninne Picic Brewing Co., 63 Conn., 551, 29 
A. 76, 25 L.R.A. 856, the word ''transaction'' is 
defined to mean something which has been acted out 
to the end. In Cheathmn v. Bobbett, 118 N. C. 343, 
24 8. E., 13, it is said the word "transaction" in 
N. C. code, in reference to joinder of actions is used 
in the sense of the conduct of finishing up an affair 
which constitutes as a whole the suhjeet of an 
action.'' 
All of the cases cited by Winegar are cases where 
artions have been filed after the original action was com-
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plrted, resulting in continuing litigation and multiplieity 
of suits. The present netions wen=- consolidated and op-
portunity offered to try the two simultaneously, obviating 
and cmnplying with the very purpose of the rule. 
In \Yillimns v. Robinson, 3 Fed. Rule Serviee, Case 1, 
1 F.H.D. 211 (D.C.D.C. 19-10), it was said: 
• ·The tern1s ''transaction and occurrence'' as 
used in Rule 13 (a) include the facts and circum-
stances out of which a claim may arise and whether 
its clain1s arise out of the same transaction or occur-
rence depends in part on whether the same evidence 
u:ill support or refnte both.L vVhere defendant in an 
action for 1naintenance filed a counterclailn for 
divorce, nmning a co-respondent and the co-respond-
ent answered, denying the charges, and later filed a 
separate action for libel and slander against the de-
fendant, it was held that the claim for libel and 
slander did not arise out of the transaction or oc-
currence upon which defendant's counterclaim 
against the correspondent was based.'' (Italics ours.) 
It will be clearly seen that the proof necessary in both 
cases was entirely different. 
Courts attempt to adminster justice and equity and 
give wide discretion to the trial court in proceeding in 
this kind of cases. For instance in Redlop Trucking Corp. 
v. Seaboard Freight Lines, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 740, 
(D.C.S.D.N.Y., 1940), 4 F. R. Serv., 13 a 11, Case 2: 
''A defendant in a federal court filed suit in a 
state court on a claim which would constitute a com-
pulsory counterclaim in the former action,'' 
held the state court action should not be staid. It was 
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said in Louisville Trust Company v. Glenn, 66 Fed. Supp. 
872, a Kentucky case decided in 1946 in an action by the 
government to recover unpaid taxes for the taxable years 
1941 and 1942 a counterclain1 seeking to set off amounts 
improperly collected for the tax year 1943 is not a com-
pulsory but a permissive counterclaim. 
In an action against certain labor unions and in-
dividual defendants under the Sherman Act defendants 
brought a proceeding under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 
U.S.~., Sec. 107, for damages alleged to have been caused 
hy wrongful issuance of injunctions against them, plain-
tiffs attempted to set up a counterclaim based upon al-
leged wrongful acts of defendants substantially the same 
as those which for1ned the basis of the proceeding under 
the Sherman Act, held (1) that such a counterclaim may 
not be entertained in a summary proceeding, and (2) that 
the counterclaim did not arise out of the same transaction 
or occurrence as the defendant's claim and, therefore, 
could not be maintained. Donnelly Garment Co. v. Inter-
national Ladies Garment \Vorkers Union, 47 Fed. Supp. 
67. 
In Kuster Laboratories, Inc. v. Lee, 14 F. R. Serv. 
13a.11, Case 1, 10 F. R. D. 351 (D.C.N.D. 1950), the court 
in dismissing a counterclaim made the following per-
tinent finding: 
''A compulsory counterclaim must arise 'out 
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the opposing party's claim.' Rule 13 (a) 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. * * * * It is patent 
that the claim and counterclaim do not arise out of 
the same transaction or smne occurrence. Each m11,st 
10 
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be e8tabl ishrd by distinct proofs." (Italics our~). 
Referring now to the test • • whether the smne evi-
dence would support or refute both'' the Winegar and the 
Olson ra~e8, how could any negligence pleaded in the 
\Vinegar case prove or refute the clain1 of Sli1n Olson 
for goods, wares and servires sold by hin1 over a period 
of five n10nths to 'Vinegar~ Conversely how could the 
evidenre in the Slhn Olson case to prove money owing 
for goods and wares and services sold to Winegar prove 
or defeat vVinegar 's claim for negligence in one only of 
approximately 500 separate purchases~ 
Frmn the foregoing and numerous other cases which 
eould be cited, it becmnes apparently certain that the 
clai1n contained in the Slim Olson case cannot be con-
sidered a compulsory counterclaim. As a matter of fact, 
under the authorities we believe that it could not even 
becon1e a permissive counterclaim. 
In the case of Noel Estate, Inc. v. Dixon and Denny, 
et al., 212 La. 313, 31 Southern (2) 810, decided by the 
Louisiana Supreme Court May 26, 1947, it was held in 
a case where a firrn of attorneys representing a client 
over a period of time earned several fees for litigation 
handled for the client and finally having collected a 
judgment for their client, sought to apply the judgment on 
the fees which had been earned in all the cases and where 
the client filed suit against the attorneys to recover the 
amount of the judgment collected by them and the attor-
neys attempted to counterclaim their earned fee against 
the claim of their client, the court held: 
"Attorneys may not in a client's action against 
them to recover the proceeds of a judgment re-
11 
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covered by the attorneys for the client, maintain a 
plea of set off and compensation based upon un-
liquidated clairns for fees for various services ren-
dered and suits filed during a period of years." 
The court further said: 
"The fees and charges claimed in defendant's 
reconventional demand ( counterclairn) other than 
those for services in the Highway Commission litiga-
tion (where the judgrnent was collected) are not con-
nected with or incidental to the subject of the main 
a$on herein. This is clearly shown by defendant's 
answer, one allegation of which is 'that on or about 
during the year 1934 the Noel Estate, Inc. employed 
your defendants as attorneys to handle their legal 
business and agreed to pay them for assisting in 
their office work and giving advice the sum of $50.00 
per month, and any other fees for work done were 
to be separately adjusted and paid.' * * * * In a 
separate suit, however, defendants may seek to 
recover s'uch fees and charges and in this connection 
all of their rights should and will be reserved." 
In D 'Auxy v. DPre, 47 App. Div. 51, 62 N.Y. S., 244, 
it appeared that the plaintiff had employed the defendant 
to collect a claim which he later assigned to the defendant 
and subsequently instituted suit to have the assignment 
set aside as being induced by fraud and for an account-
ing. The defendant filed a counterclaim, seeking to set 
off his claim for fees for services rendered the plaintiff 
from time to time.L An order overruling plaintiff's de-
murrer to the counterclaim was reversed on appeal, the 
court holding that since the claim was n~t on the contract, 
the defendant's counterclain1 not arising out of or con-
12 
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nccted with the plaintiff's transaction wns nn ind0p0nd-
ent eause of action and could not be set off. 
In Big Cola Corp. Y. \Yorld Bottling Co., Ltd. 7 
F. R. SerY. 13b .3 Ca~e 1; 13-± F. (2d) 718 (C C A Gth 
19-±3) the court in discussing the difference between a 
pennissiYe and a cmnpulsory connterclairn said: 
• • The difference between the cornpulsory re-
quirernent of stating counterclairns under Rule 13 
(a) and perrnis~ive provision of stating such clain1s 
under Rule 1i (b), depends on whether such claims 
arise 'out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of an opposing parties claim.' vVhere 
a counterclaim is an essentially independent action 
it is a permissive counterclaim; and even where 
pleaded in answer to an opposing parties claim, the 
trial court is given discretion to order separate trials 
of claim and counterclaim." (Italics ours). 
In :Martin v. Throckmartin, 15 Pa. 632, it was held 
well settled that an attorney who has collected money for 
his client cannot set off against his client's claim for 
that money a claim due him for services as counsel for 
any proceeding other than that out of which the money 
came. 
These latter cases, which are similar to the instant 
case where Winegar seeks to compel Olson to counter-
claim independent claims for goods, wares and services 
sold to Winegar other than at the time Olson serviced 
' the truck which became the basis of Winegar's action, 
hold that such cases are not even permissive counter-
~- claims and hence could certainly not be comptllsory. 
It will he noted under Section (b) of Rule 13 the rule 
13 
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broadens the scope of 13 (a) by adding 
"A pleading may (Italics ours) state as a coun. 
terclairn any claim against an opposing party not 
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is 
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." 
In any event the two cases were consolidated, which gave 
\Vinegar every right and benefit he could have obtained 
under the rule, even if Olson's claim had formed the basis 
of a compulsory counterclairn, which it did not, and so 
an analysis of the two clain1s and the procedure followed 
leaves Winegar shorn clean of any right, legal or equi-
table, to atten1pt to defeat the Slim Olson case on a tech-
nicality of procedure, and it must be kept in mind that 
the rules of procedure are not jurisdictional but are 
procedural only and are not intended to defeat legitimate 
clain1s. 
An analysis of the defendant's authorities cited in his 
brief demonstrates the difference between the cases cited 
by him and the case at bar. For instance, in the Moore 
v. New York Cotton Exchange case it will be noted that 
the entire transactions covered arose out of and by virtue 
of a contract where the plaintiff sued to have the contract 
between the New York Stock Exchange and Western 
Union declared to be in violation of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, and the defendants set up the defense that 
they had refused to install the ticker service, which was 
the basis of the contract, but that the plaintiff had never· 
theless used their service without right and asked for an 
injunction. The court's attention is properly called to the 
statement of the Supreme Court in its decision, wherein 
it sajd: 
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· · Tran::mction i~ a word of flexible 1neaninp;. It 
may rmnprehend a series of 1nany occurrences, de-
pending not so n1uch upon the in11nediateness of their 
connection as upon their logiral relationship.'' 
\Yherein could it be said that purchases of 1notor fuel, 
oil, etr. on entirely separate days for use in entirely 
separate units have any logical relationship to the alleged 
negligence of Slin1 Olsons on January ~-l- ~ 
In Doug-las v. \Visconsin Alumni Research Founda-
tion, 11 F. R. Serv. 13a .11, Case 1; 81 F. Supp. lfl7 
(D.C.X.D. Ill., 1948), the court quoted the ~foore case 
cited by the appellant, as follows: 
''The case of ~ioore v. New York Cotton Ex-
change 1925, 270 U. S. 593, 46 S. Ct. 367, 371, 70 
L. Ed. 750, 45 A. L. R. 1370, sets forth the basic 
rules for deter1nining whether or not a compulsory 
counterclaim exists: 
'Two classes of counterclaims thus are provided 
for: (a) One 'arising out of the transaction which is 
the subject matter of the suit' which must be plead-
ed; and (b) another '1chich might be the s~tbject 
of an independent s~tit in equity' and which may be 
brought forward at the option of the defendant." 
(Italics our). 
The instant case clearly falls into the (b) or second type 
of claim set out in this decision. 
Again, the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Musanti-
Phillips, Inc., where suit was brought by plaintiff for 
freight, a counterclaim was filed covering a series of 
diversions of a negligent nature, all of which contributed 
to a final result-deterioration of a perishable product. 
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The Eastern Transportation Company case again 
is an action for freight upon a single shipment where 
the government counterclaimed damages on that particu-
lar shipment for demurrage and other expenses, which 
was perfectly proper. 
In the Advance Thresher Company v. Klein case 
suit was brought on a series of notes covering the pur-
chase price of a threshing machine. All of the notes 
were related to and a part of the purchase price. It 
should be noticed that the contract of purchase and sale 
provided for the making of repairs, and the suit resulted 
from damages which occurred in making the repairs 
''pursuant to the contract between plaintiff and defend-
ant.'' 
The Storey case cited therein holds that 
''The transaction comprehended within the 
n1eaning of the section of the code is not limited to 
the facts set forth in the complaint but includes the 
entire series of facts and mutual conduct of the 
parties in the business or proceeding between them, 
which formed the basis of the agreement." (Italics 
ours). 
The agreernent in the Winegar case was that Slim 01-
sons, Inc. would undertake the servicing of the particuiar 
unit in question on January 24, and would use due dili-
gence and care in doing so, and the plaintiff, Winegar, 
would pay the reasonable costs thereof. That is the en-
tire transaction. The fallacy of Winegar's position is 
clearly pointed out in the second quote from the Storey 
case on page 12 of his brief. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err in awarding counsel fees 
in this action. Under well-known and well-established 
contract and agency law, appellant was bound by the 
tern1s of the contract, as represented by the sales slips 
signed by hin1self and by his agents acting in his behalf. 
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in 
holding that this action is not barred under Rule 13 (a) of 
Utah Rules of Civil Proeedure. It is obvious under the 
law, and under this particular fact situation, that the 
open account was not, and could not be found to eomprise 
a part of the same transaction or occurrence that appel-
lants claim for dmnages arose from. Appellant claimed 
damages in his original cause of action, from alleged neg-
ligent work done to his truck by respondent's agent on 
one particular day. He does not and cannot connect his 
alleged damage to any of the other transactions. The 
fact that appellant purchased supplies and services prior 
to the act he complained of, and subsequent to said act, 
has no bearing on his original action. The facts neces-
sary to prove appellant's case are entirely different from 
the ones necessary to prove respondent's case. At the 
very most, it might be said that this action might have 
constituted a permissive counterclaim. It is impossible 
to, find any abuse of discretion by the trial court, and 
its ruling and decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
HUGGINS & HUGGINS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
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